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INTRODUCTION
The ongoing reform of China's economic system towards increased
reliance on market mechanisms has generated dramatic growth in many
sectors,' including the creation and vigorous development of securities
markets. An observer might easily conclude that China is moving in the
direction of a western-style market economy, but that conclusion would
fundamentally misconstrue the motivation and effect of the reforms.
China's government seeks neither to abandon nor to dilute its commit-
ment to state ownership of the means of production-the foundation of
a socialist society-but rather desires to enhance the operation and pro-
ductivity of state-owned enterprises.
The extent and rapidity of growth of China's securities market is
evidenced by facts concerning Shanghai and Shenzhen, the world's
youngest stock exchanges:
- 296 listed companies as of April 1995
- more than 360 products trading
- daily trading volume over RMB 18 Billion (approximately US
$2 billion)
weekly trading volume over RMB 60 Billion at the exchanges'
peak swing2
- over 20 million Chinese participants in the securities markets,
a number that grows by more than 10,000 people per day3
1. As stated by one commentator, "China's move toward a more open market economy
has unlocked the nation's immense economic potential, spurring dizzying growth rates."
Benjamin R. Tarbutton, China-A National Regulatory Framework for the PRC's Stock
Markets Begins to Emerge, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 411, 411 (1994).
2. Gao Xiqing, The Perceived Unreasonable Man-A Response to Fang Liufang, 5 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 271, 278 (1995).
3. Han Guojian, Move to Standardize Stock Market, BEIJING REV., July 31-Aug. 6, 1995,
at 10..
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Securities markets in other Asian countries have achieved comparable
levels, but never in so short a time. The process required more than
twenty years in Japan and Hong Kong, and more than thirty years in
Korea and Taiwan.4
The legal framework for this burgeoning securities market is also
developing, but at a slower pace. China is still in the process of drafting
a national securities law.5 This legislation, when promulgated, can be
expected to reflect a strong influence of U.S. securities law. China has
accepted an offer from the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission to
provide technical advice,6 and the overall intent is to meet international
standards of securities regulation in order to attract more foreign invest-
ment. Nevertheless, an imported model of regulation will produce
different results when it is superimposed on China's unique economic
system and ideology.
Part I of this article establishes the scope of analysis and defines the
Chinese use of the term "security," which is more limited than under
American law. Parts II and III briefly examine the history of Chinese
securities laws and the understanding of securities by the Chinese peo-
ple. Part IV focuses on the government's motivations in establishing the
securities markets. Part V discusses the distinctively Chinese approach
ofclassifying shares according to the characteristics and nationality of
permitted shareholders. Part VI addresses the future development of
Chinese securities markets. The conclusion reflects on the significance
of western forms of securities ownership and regulation in the Chinese
economic and ideological context.
I. THE HISTORY OF CHINESE SECURITIES
MARKETS AND REGULATION
Securities law in China, as in the United States, is intended to
regulate the issuance and subsequent trading of stock, while penalizing
fraud and helping investors make well-informed investment decisions in
a fair, equal, open and honest stock market. Corporate, rather than
securities, law deals with matters of internal corporate governance-a
point not always understood by outside commentators.7
4. Gao, supra note 2, at 278.
5. The project-is assigned to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
See Han, supra note 3, at 10-11.
6. Patrick Harverson, U.S. SEC Offers to Advise Beijing Securities Regulators, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1994, at 10-11.
7. See Matthew D. Latimer, Gilding the Iron Rice Bowl: The Illusions of Shareholder
Rights In China, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1105-06 (1994). The article criticizes China's
current securities -regulations for failing to protect shareholders' rights to elect directors, to
vote on extraordinary corporate matters or to remove directors for cause. The criticism is not
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A key element delineating the scope of securities regulation is the
definition of the term "security." In China, the term refers only to stock
(or shares) and bonds.8 Shares represent ownership, or equity, in a
corporation, and bonds are a debt obligation owed by the corporation to
others.9 This narrow interpretation (which probably comports with the
average person's assumptions of the meaning of "security") is far less
inclusive than the U.S. interpretation, which includes puts, calls, options,
and such vague and encompassing concepts as "investment contracts"
and "participations in a profit-sharing agreement.' 0l China's narrow
definition reflects the fact that its securities laws are still at an early
stage. Consistent with the Chinese usage, this paper will focus only on
stock and bonds.
The concept of "stock" was first recognized in China in the late
nineteenth century (in the late Qing Dynasty), two or three hundred
years later than in western countries." The first securities law was the
Law of Stock Exchanges issued in 1914 by the Northern Warlords'
government. 2 The most complete securities law in pre-communist China
was promulgated in 1929 by the Guomindang government. 13
Establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949
brought major changes in securities as in all other fields. During the first
well-founded; such matters are outside the scope of securities regulation.
8. CHENG TAO & BO RUIJIAN, ZHENGQUANFA TONGLUN [GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
SECURITIES LAW] 27-28 (1994) [hereinafter CHENG & Bo, SECURITIES LAW].
9. Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance? Securitiza-
tion of State-Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1,
28 (1995).
10. The US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") provides the defini-
tion of security as follows:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty
or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit,
for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate
of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but ... not ... currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited."
15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (1994).
11. HE QINHUA ET AL., ZHONGxI FALUWENHUA TONGLUN [THE GENERAL INTRODUC-
TION OF CHINESE-WESTERN LEGAL CULTURE] 141 (1994) [hereinafter HE, LEGAL CULTURE].
12. CHENG & Bo, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 8, at 8.
13. Id. at 9.
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several years, throughout much of the 1950s, the government permitted
securities exchanges to continue operations. 14 In 1959, however, the
securities system was eliminated. 5
In 1978, important ideological changes were adopted by the Com-
munist Party at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11 th Central Committee.
16
The following year the decision was made to reopen securities markets
and, in December 1990, the first securities exchange was established in
Shanghai.'
7
Since 1986, many securities rules and regulations have been re-
leased. Principal provisions include the Interim Rules Concerning the
Management of the Bank of the People's Republic of China (issued
November 7, 1986), the Notice Concerning Strengthening Management
of Stock and Bonds (March 1987), the Interim Methods of Management
of Stock Companies (1990), the Interim Methods Concerning Manage-
ment of Business of Stock Exchanges (1990), the Interim Methods
Concerning Management of Stock Exchange Inter-provinces (1990), and
the Interim Rules Regarding Management of Stock Issuance and Trade
(1993)."
Much of the most important regulation was implemented at the local
level. The Provisional Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Adminis-
tration of the Issue and Trading of Shares [Shanghai Measures] were
promulgated on November 26, 1990.1" The Provisional Measures of
Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and Trading of
Shares [Shenzhen Measures] were promulgated by the government of
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on May 15, 1991.20 These two
local laws played a very important role until the issuance of the Interim
Rules Regarding Management of Stock Issuance and Exchange of April
22, 1993.
The effort to create a national securities law began in July, 1992,
when a drafting group was established by the Standing Committee of
the Chinese People's Congress. 2' As of the end of 1996, final legislation
had not yet been issued.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 10.
16. In December 1978, the CPC launched a policy of economic reform and opened
China to the outside world. See THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA
195-98 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Christine Wong eds., 1985).
17. CHENG & Bo, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 8, at 10.
18. Id. at 10-11.
19. Jia Zhao & Li Qian, Trading Stocks in China: Development, Regulation, Issues and
Prospects, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., June 15, 1992, at 8 and 12 n.4.
20. Id. at 8 & 12 n.5.
21. CHENG & Bo, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 8, at 11.
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II. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITIES
Although stock has been used in some form in China for some time,
the people at large did not have an opportunity to become familiar with
the term until 1979. In all likelihood, therefore, a long period of time
will be necessary for the Chinese people to develop a satisfactory under-
standing of stock and the securities markets. Current popular attitudes
are unsophisticated in a number of important respects:
1) One issue is China's fundamental orientation and attitude to-
wards commerce. Historically, policies, ideology, and attitudes
have "regarded farming as superior to business" (zhong nong
qing shang). The goal was not to develop efficiencies and profit
through trade but rather to "close the door and be self-con-
tained" (bi guan zi shou). The commodity economy was under-
developed. In this socio-political and economic context, securi-
ties and securities trading had no place.
2) Popular interest in purchasing stock has been overwhelmingly
motivated by the prospect of rapid appreciation in market value,
rather than by long-term fundamental analysis. One commenta-
tor opines that 99% of private investors are oriented towards
speculative profits.22 Investors rarely inquire into the stock
issuer's economic condition, operations, or future prospects,
apparently assuming that the government will not allow an
enterprise to fail. Dividends do not enter into the analysis. At-
tention is directed solely to short-term fluctuations in price.
3) The concept and level of risk associated with securities are not
well understood. Focusing exclusively on the prospect of specu-
lative profits, investors fail or refuse to recognize the corre-
sponding risks. They assume, based on their socialist experience,
that the government will protect the people from suffering,
including the loss of profits.
4) Securities law is not widely understood, contributing to many
violations on the stock exchange.23
22. Yongxin Song, Some Special Features of the Organs of Governance of Chinese
Business Corporations, 24 CAP. U.L. REv. 207, 217 (1995).
23. HE, LEGAL CULTURE, supra note 11, at 143-149.
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One consequence of these attitudes is a lack of attention to corporate
governance. Investors who focus solely on short-term profits, rather than
long-term investment, are not likely to consider themselves owners of
the corporation or to exercise their rights as shareholders. They may
lack motivation to vote, to supervise the board of directors and to pur-
sue any wrongdoing that may occur through derivative actions, as
happens in the United States. The shareholders' rights provided by the
first national corporation law will have little practical meaning, and the
discretion of state appointed managers likely will be unchecked.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITIES LAW:
A WORK IN PROGRESS
Efforts are being made to regulate securities markets at the national
level, rather than continuing to rely exclusively on the municipal regula-
tions of Shanghai and Shenzhen. To date, the effort has resulted in
"rules" issued by the State Council, but not the more permanent and
authoritative "law" which is promulgated by the National People's
Congress.
A. The National Stock Rules Issued by the State Council
The People's Bank of China (PBOC) made the first national effort
to regulate the exchanges, taking a decentralized approach. The PBOC
delegated regulation of each of the regional exchanges to the appropriate
regional branches of the bank.24
The decentralized approach was a failure in a number of respects,
damaging investors' confidence in the legitimacy of the markets.25 The
different markets drafted their own regulations and created "parallel
systems for trading, clearing, and settlement., 26 Widespread fraud oc-
curred, leading to serious public disturbances in the case of Shenzhen in
1992.27
As a result, new agencies were created to supplant the PBOC in this
field. The new State Council Securities Committee (SCSC) and the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)28 were authorized to regulate
securities markets throughout the country, including the Shanghai and
24. Tarbutton, supra note 1, at 414-15.
25. Id. at 420.
26. Michael Spencer, Securities Markets in China, 32 FIN. & DEV. 28, 31 (1995).
27. Citizens in Shenzhen rioted after blunders in the issuance of forms prevented them
from applying to purchase shares. Tarbutton, supra note 1, at 420.
28. Anthony Rowley, Making It Safer to Trade in the Chinese Stock Markets, Bus. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1994, at 17.
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Shenzhen exchanges and several smaller, informal exchanges which had
appeared elsewhere.29
The provisions currently in effect are the Interim Rules Regarding
Stock Issuance and Exchange (the "Interim Rules"). 30 The Interim Rules
form the foundation for future national legislation, still in its infancy.3'
The ideological principles enunciated in the Interim Rules clarify that
Chinese securities markets are not based on western-style market orienta-
tions. Instead, the purposes stated are to promote development of the
socialist market economy, to establish and develop a unified and highly
effective stock market, to protect the interests of investors and of the
public, and to promote the development of a national economy.32 The
Interim Rules reiterate the leading position of socialist public ownership,
and specify that securities ownership or trading shall not infringe upon
state-owned assets.33
Specific rules in support of these goals provide an example of the
distinctive Chinese characteristics of the law, despite its apparent similarity
to U.S. law. For example, no single person is allowed to hold more than
0.5% of the outstanding common shares of any listed company. If that
limit is ever exceeded the company can, with the consent of the China
Security Supervisory Committee, buy back the excess shares at either the
original price or the market price, whichever is lower.34 Under this rule,
substantial changes in control of corporations are virtually impossible, and
hostile takeovers are out of the question.
B. Delay in Formulating National Law, and Resulting Problems
Development of national securities law (as distinct from rules) 35 has
yet to reach fruition. The effort began in July 1992, and since then has
produced more than 10 drafts.36
Various reasons have been offered to account for the delay. Some
people thought that municipal regulations already in operation were
29. Tarbutton, supra note 1, at 420.
30. Gupiao Faxing Yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Interim Rules Regarding Stock
Issuance and Exchange], reprinted in Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], May 5, 1993, at 2. For
a detailed introduction of the rules, see Tarbutton, supra note 1, at 413-26.
31. Spencer, supra note 26, at 31.
32. Interim Rules, supra note 30, art. 1. The authors translated all the relevant provisions
of the Interim Rules and will be responsible for the translations.
33. Interim Rules, supra note 30, art. 4.
34. Interim Rules, supra note 30, at Art. 46. This provision does not apply to holders of
B-shares or H-shares from foreign countries and from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan areas.
35. The words "law" and "rule" are different in the sense that law is promulgated by the
National People's Congress, and preempts rules which are usually issued by the State Council.
36. Andrew Browne, Arguments Hold Up China Securities Law, THE REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC
BUSINESS REPORT, Nov. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
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adequate, and that a national law in this field would be premature.37
Another important view has been that "it was better to delay than to try
to regulate imperfect markets with imperfect rules."38
Delay, however, has caused difficulties, including machinations used
by foreigners to circumvent local regulations. One example is found in
the automotive industry, in which foreign companies found their entry into
the Chinese market seriously impeded by red tape. Japan's Isuzu Motors
and Itochu Corporation solved the problem by buying 25% of the out-
standing shares of Shanghai-listed Beijing Lightbus Company. 39 The shares
purchased were officially intended only for domestic "legal persons"
(institutions), but the foreign corporations nevertheless accomplished the
purchase.' Ford Motor Company, unable so far to build its own vehicles
in China, is pursuing a somewhat similar approach. Ford is seeking control
of Jiangling Motors Corp., which is listed on the Shanghai exchange, by
buying up to 80% of its B class of shares, which are reserved for purchas-
es in hard currency.'
The absence of a national securities law facilitates this type of activity.
As stated by one western securities broker in Shanghai, almost anything
is possible because, to a large extent, stitching together a market deal
depends on a creative reading of local regulations, and on how well the
case is presented to securities authorities.42 Though local rules may intend
ownership of legal person shares to be limited to domestic institutions,
they do not clearly prohibit purchase by foreigners.43
C. Western Influence on Chinese Securities Law
In many respects, Chinese securities law will be similar to U.S.
securities law and will be easy for U.S. lawyers or brokers to practice.
One important basis for this conclusion is the ongoing cooperation
between the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the China
Securities Regulatory Commission. On April 28, 1994, SEC chairman
37. Id.
38. Id. However, that comment is contrary to China's general practice of drafting
experimental law (sometimes called drafting law) first, then correcting the imperfect parts and
issuing formal law. The Interim Rules promulgated by the State Council are probably intended
to be the experimental law.
39. Andrew Browne, In China's Stock Markets, Anything is Possible, THE REUTER
EUROPEAN BUSINESS REPORT, August 17, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Landmark Chinese Share Deal With Japan Stalled, THE REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC BUSI-
NESS REPORT, August 10, 1995, available in LExIs, News Library, Non-US File.
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Arthur Levitt signed a Memorandum of Understanding with his Chinese
counterpart, advising Beijing securities regulators on developing Chinese
financial markets." This conclusion also is consistent with traditional
Chinese patterns of adopting Western concepts but adapting them to suit
China's needs.45
D. Retention of Control by the State
Although the national securities law, when it is ultimately promul-
gated, will utilize U.S. concepts and structures, certain key factors will
produce distinctly different consequences. The main issuers of securities
will be the government, state banks and state enterprises, and those same
entities will also be the main holders. 6 Shares reserved for ownership by
the state and by domestic legal persons (institutions) will dominate within
state-owned enterprises, leaving the shares held by individual investors
in a secondary role.47 Through means such as these, joint stock companies
will retain a socialist characteristic. 8
IV. THE MOTIVATION OF CHINESE SECURITIES LAW
A. Restructuring State-Owned Enterprises
Articles discussing Chinese securities law commonly assume that the
intention is to privatize the state-owned enterprises. 49 That premise cannot
be supported.
' Pri'vatization has usually been regarded as the opposite of the process
of nationalization. It is often believed that privatization of state enterprises
reflects the predominance of capitalist thinking, whereas nationalization
is a sign of socialist development. 0 This analysis may accurately charac-
terize the reforms in many countries such as the former Soviet and Eastern
44. Harverson, supra note 6, at 6.
45. Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of State Companies in China, 1993
COLUM. Bus, L. REV. 301, 302 (1993).
46. CHENG & Bo, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 8, at 14.
47. Individuals and private enterprises may not promote joint-stock companies; the shares
held by individual investors may not exceed 0.5% of the outstanding shares of the company.
48. CHENG & Bo, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 8, at 14.
49. Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing and the Emerging Securities
Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 62 (1993). See also Bersani, supra
note 45.
50. Baev, supra note 9, at 1 n.127.
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Europe nations.' In contrast, different motivations and ideological
imperatives exist in China. Securities markets in China do not remove
enterprises from state control, or promote capitalism in a Western sense.
Their effect and purpose is to preserve and enhance the socialist order in
a number of ways.
First, the securities system enhances both the financing and the
management of state-owned enterprises. One of the main purposes of the
system is to absorb money from Chinese citizens, which is then channeled
into productive enterprises controlled by the state.52 Further, allowing
private stockholders some participation in selecting directors and managers
of these enterprises is intended to increase managerial accountability,
efficiency, and profitability. The state also includes employees among
those permitted to own equity in an enterprise, hoping thereby to increase
their incentive to perform well and to enhance productivity. 3
Second, stock markets represent an experiment in modernizing the
socialist economy. Commentators have noted support for this strategy from
the highest authority, Deng Xiaoping. In 1992, Deng addressed the issue
as follows:
Are securities and the stock market good or bad? Is there any danger
in adopting such things? Do they exist exclusively in capitalism? Can
they also be adopted in a socialist system? People are allowed to
consider such matters further, but resolute action must be taken to
experiment with such things. 4
To underline the message that experimentation did not represent an
embrace of capitalism, Deng stated: "We can always close it if it does not
prove to be conducive to our socialist market economy."55 Similarly, an
official of the commission charged with development of the securities
industry was careful to distinguish between use of securities and privat-
ization in the liberal or western sense.56
51. See, e.g., ROMAN FRYDMAN AND ANDREZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE: IS THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? 10 (discussing privatization, including the
reintroduction of the institution of property, as a step away from socialist systems and their
inherent inefficiency).
52. The citizens in China have $361 billion in personal savings available for investment.
See Michael Irl Nikkel, Note, "Chinese Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing: Question of
Fiduciary Duty in China's Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 505 n.ll (1995).
53. Bersani, supra note 45, at 303.
54. Id. at 301 (quoting Deng Xiaoping, on his January 1992 tour of Southern China). See
also Qian, supra note 49, at 84 n.88.
55. Gao, supra note 2, at 274.
56. Liu Hongru, Vice Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic
System stated that establishing a securities industry is desirable, but that is not to be confused
with actually pursuing privatization. Qian, supra note 46, at 83.
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Third, the government, through various ministries, continues to own
sufficient stock in enterprises to maintain control. 7 This factor has critical
practical importance. In fact, the purpose of legal person shares was to
retain ownership of key shares in government-related institutions and to
serve as a barrier against privatization. 58The stock that is sold to individu-
als does not preclude continued government control.
B. Limited Privatization
The policy of drawing in private investors, without ceding control of
state-owned enterprises, has been aptly termed "limited privatization" (or
partial privatization).,9 With a bit of innovative thinking, the approach can
be reconciled with the socialist ideology that requires ownership of the
means of production by the state. As one insightful commentator has
explained, "as long as the state retains a controlling interest in the
enterprise, no assets have been sold; rather, private capital has been
brought under state control." 6°
To some extent, the effect of limited privatization has parallels in
other countries, including developed countries with economic systems and
ideologies distinctively different from China's. It is common throughout
the world for governments to share with their private sectors ownership
of industries that are critical to the national economy and defense, yet to
retain substantial government control.61
C. Corporatization
Securities markets are natural adjuncts to a broader program of
transforming existing state enterprises from subdivisions of the government
into separate corporate entities (with partial government ownership). This
process of "corporatization" 62 is reflected in China's first national
corporation act, enacted fairly recently. The Corporation Law of the
57. Nikkel, supra note 52, at 517.
58. Fang Liufang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149,
208 (1995).
59. Bersani, supra note 45, at 306.
60. Id. at 306.
61. Governments often control "strategic industries in energy, telecommunications, defense,
transport and other sectors of national priority." Baev, supra note 9, at 12 and n.44. Baev cites
statistics on government ownership of equity stock in electrical companies in developed
countries. More than 75% belong to the state in the European countries of Austria, France,
Norway, Switzerland, Britain, and the Netherlands, and also in New Zealand, Australia, and
Canada. Between 25% and 75% belong to the state in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Germany, Spain,
Sweden, and the United States. Id.
62. Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated The First Corporation Law of the
People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273, 274 (1995).
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People's Republic of China provides the legal framework for restructuring
the organization and management of state-owned enterprises.63
Corporatizing is intended to remove the state from detailed management
of business operations, creating business entities that can be better
managed, more competitive, and more productive. 64
D. Securitization
"Securitization" is the next logical step in the program to improve the
efficiency, financing, and management of state enterprises. Securitization
consists of dividing into many smaller units an asset that is too large or
too regulated to be plausibly transferred as a whole. One advantage of this
process is that the smaller units can then be readily traded in primary and
secondary markets.65 One example is a huge loan to buy a high-rise
building that is too large to be sold except to a handful of major finan-
ciers. If the loan is divided into thousands of bonds, however, it can be
sold to small investors, who are attracted to them in part because the
bonds can readily be resold.
In the case of state-owned enterprises, the first step is to convert an
enterprise that was organized as a governmental unit into a joint stock
company, 66 or to corporatize. 67 The company can then issues shares to gain
additional capital.
The next step might be to privatize by selling the majority of shares
to the public. This step, however, is not inevitable or necessary. "Securi-
tization" is distinctly different from "privatization., '68 A state-owned
enterprise could, for example, issue shares only to its employees, or could
sell some shares to the public but retain a majority interest. If, after
securitization, effective control remains with the government, the enter-
prise remains socialist.
V. CLASSIFICATION OF SHARES
In Western countries, large corporations routinely establish two or
more classes of stock, such as common and preferred shares. The differ-
ence among classes relates to dividend expectations, voting rights, and
rights on liquidation. In China, stock is also divided into classes, but in
a distinctive manner. Classification is used for the ideological purpose of
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Baev, supra note 9, at 5 & n.2.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
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maintaining the leading role of government in the economy by having
state and public organizations hold the majority of shares.69
A. Classification Based on Ownership
Several classes of stock are established on the basis of the character-
istics of the investors for which the shares are intended.
1. State shares (Goujia Gu)
One class of stock, labelled state shares, is both issued and held by
government entities. When a state-owned enterprise issues securities, a
portion must be held by either a government organization or by a holding
company authorized by the government. 70 Detailed measures adopted in
1994 designate how state assets can be exchanged for state shares in
merger or reorganization situations.7'
2. Legal person shares (Faren Gu)
Legal person shares are owned by entities created or recognized by
law, as opposed to natural persons. There are five types:
(a) State-owned legal person shares
Shares that are owned not by the state directly, but rather by an entity
that is itself owned by the state, are labelled state-owned legal person
shares.72 For example, trust and investment companies, or securities
companies, own this type of stock.73
69. Fang, supra note 58, at 201.
70. Id. at 202.
71. On November 3, 1994, the Interim Measures for Administering the Rights of State
Shares in Joint-Stock Limited Liability Companies (Gufen Youxian Gongsi Guoyou Guquan
Guanli Zanxing Banfa) provided that state shares may be obtained by transfer of state assets.
Fang summarized the circumstances as follows:
(1) a state enterprise absorbs and merges into a joint-stock company; (2) a joint-stock
company's accumulated capital exceeds the net book asset value of a state enterprise
by 50%; (3) a state enterprise's autonomous operating capital is completely or largely
transferred to a joint-stock company; or (4) state shares are the initial shares offered
by a company subscribed to by a state investment organization.
Id. at 130.
72. Id. at 204.
73. As explained by one commentator, the only difference between state shares and state-
owned legal person shares is that the "holder of state shares must be a government organization
or a company with governmental functions; the holder of state-owned legal person shares may
not be a governmental organ." Id.
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(b) Collective enterprise legal person shares
Collective enterprise legal person shares are a class of shares held by
collective enterprises, of which there are three types. One type of
collective enterprise is owned by a local government. A second type has
assets derived from the state but, for policy reasons, is deemed not to be
owned by the state. Collective enterprises of the third type use capital
invested by individuals but attach themselves to a supervisory adminis-
trative department for purposes such as gaining tax benefits, licenses or
other benefits available only to public enterprises.74
(c) Private enterprise legal person shares
Private enterprise legal person shares constitute another class of stock
that is available to private enterprises that enjoy the status of legal persons.
Such enterprises are limited liability companies financed entirely by
private individuals.75
(d) Foreign invested enterprise legal person shares
Some shares are available to foreign-owned enterprises that have
received legal person status. Currently three types of shares are authorized,
each regulated under different laws.76
(e) Institutional legal person shares
A further category of shares is owned by institutions with legal person
status that have raised funds from individuals. Examples include trade
unions, the Communist Youth League, and the Women's Federation. 77
74. Id. at 205.
75. Id. at 206.
76. Besides the Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, there are other three
laws regulating foreign-owned shares: The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (adopted July 1, 1979), available in Lexis,
Intlaw Library, Chinalaw No. 41; The Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly
Foreign-Owned Enterprises (adopted April 22, 1986), available in Lexis, Intlaw Library,
Chinalaw No. 345; and The Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Contractual Joint Ventures (adopted April 13, 1988), available in Lexis, Intlaw Library,
Chinalaw No. 463.
77. Fang, supra note 58, at 207.
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3. Individual shares (Geren Gu)
When shares are held by individual Chinese citizens, they are termed
individual shares. These are further divided into "internal employee
shares" (neibu zhigong gu), which are available to the employees of the
issuing company, or "public individual shares" (shuihui geren gu), which
are offered to the general public.78
4. Foreign capital shares (Waizi Gu)
Foreign capital shares, which include B shares and H shares, 79 are
denominated in foreign exchange and intended to be held only by foreign
investors. B shares are denominated in U.S. dollars in Shanghai and Hong
Kong dollars in Shenzhen. H shares are listed on the Hong Kong or
foreign stock exchanges. 80 Finally, N shares are listed in New York Stock
Exchange and presumably can be owned by anyone who can buy on that
market.81
Originally, one reason for establishing separate classes for Chinese
citizens and foreigners was that Renminbi (the Chinese currency) were not
freely convertible into hard currency. 2 That rationale no longer applies.
Another reason was to limit the percentage of any corporation's stock that
foreigners could own.
B. The Problems of Classification
The establishment of multiple classes of stock within a single corpo-
ration raises questions of corporate governance that are important, but as
yet poorly answered. Information or regulations explaining the relative
rights of different classes is sparse.
1. The Convertibility of Different Shares
China's security rules and regulations do not have clear provisions
explaining whether shares of one class can be converted into shares of a
different class, either by the corporation or by the holders of the securities.
As one author has pointed out, usually the only listed company shares that
78. Id. at 210.
79. Id. at 311.
80. Spencer, supra note 26, at 28-29.
81. Performance of N stocks on the New York Stock Exchange has been disappointing.
SEC Chairman Warns that U.S. is Cautious About Chinese Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1996,
at B14A.
82. See Gao, supra note 2, at 12.
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are transferable are individual shares.83 Companies that are governed by
local governments cannot freely convert legal person shares into individual
shares, because doing so is considered a special privilege (though some
companies apparently have converted shares surreptitiously). 84 As of
February 1994, only 14 companies had received permission from the
Shanghai exchange to convert their shares into individual shares.85
There is no evidence that conversion in the opposite direction, from
individual shares into legal person shares, is allowed. Nor is it likely that
shares held by foreign investors can be converted into legal person shares
or state shares. The Interim Rules are silent on this issue.
2. Voting Powers or Rights of Different Shares
Unfortunately, the Chinese corporation act does not indicate how the
holders of A, B, H, and other stock classes may exercise their rights. In
regard to voting rights, U.S. corporate practice is that each class votes
separately, and a majority of each class is necessary to approve major
decisions. China might follow the U.S. model, or instead treat all shares,
regardless of class, as one large constituency. The statute is silent on the
issue.86
If the minority shareholders do not vote as separate classes, or receive
some other form of protection, they will always be outvoted and will have
few meaningful rights. The State, owning 51% or more of the stock, could
elect all of the directors and control all corporate decisions.87
C. Comments on Share Classification
China's system of classifying shares is understandable in light of the
government's intention to avoid privatization, but leaves the owners of
many classes of shares in an uncertain and problematic situation. The
issues involved include control within the corporation and the relation of
each class to the others. Interestingly, Beijing University economics
professor Li Yining once proposed the trading of three classes of shares
83. Fang, supra note 58, at 212.
84. Observers of the Shanghai exchange have stated that as of November 13, 1992, the
first thirteen companies listed on the exchange "had surreptitiously put 30 million yuan worth
of state and legal person shares into circulation. The way in which the Shanghai exchange gave
local companies special privileges and concealed the news from the mass of investors received
criticism from the news media." Fang, supra note 57, at 213 n.142 (citing Ping Wei, Hushi
liutong panzi jiujing duoda [In Fact How Large is the Circulation in Shanghai?], ZHENGQUAN
SHICHANG ZHOUKAN [SECURITIES MARKET WEEKLY], 1992, no. 18, at 18).
85. Fang, supra note 58, at 213.
86. Art & Gu, supra note 62, at 301.
87. See Song, supra note 22, at 215-18.
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in three separate securities markets, defined by characteristics of investors.
Legal person shares, for example, would be traded only among legal
persons.8"
Trading only within each class, however, would eventually destroy
the incentive of individuals and foreign investors to invest more money
in the securities markets. Those investors cannot foresee how the majority
shareholder(s), namely the government, would treat their minority position,
and would recognize that they have neither protection nor voice in the
decision-making process. Furthermore, because the leader of each enter-
prise is usually selected by the majority holders, he will be responsive
only to the government instead of all the shareholders. If he were to abuse
his power, the minority shareholders would be unable to remove him from
his position.89 The purposes of economic reform (i.e., decentralization,
deregulation, high productivity, high efficiency and good management)
would be defeated.
Fortunately, there is some good news. China has unveiled legislation
that tends to dismantle the dichotomy between shares reserved for citizens
and those reserved for foreigners. Instead, the law allows up to 35%
foreign ownership. 9° Regardless of the limitations of current law, there is
hope that foreign investors can participate in China's A share market as
well as B and H share markets, and may be able to improve their position
in relation to the majority. 91
Moreover, practical factors may adequately protect the interests of
foreign shareholders, even when the law does not provide them with
substantial rights. The Chinese majority shareholders may select foreign
88. Under this proposal, if a company's shares were all state shares, trading would be
limited to state investment organizations. If a company had both state shares and public
organization shares, trading could occur among state investment organizations, among public
organizations, and between the two types of shareholders. If a company had state shares, public
organization shares, and individual shares, then trading should be confined to the respective
categories of shareholders. Qian, supra note 49, at 212 (citing Li Yining, Guoyou Qiye Zai
Gongyouzhi Jichushang Shixian Gufenzhide Tujing [The Path for State Owned Enterprises to
Realize the Share System on the Basis of Public Ownership], GAIGO [REFORM], 1991, no. 1,
at 158.
89. See Julia Leung & Craig S. Smith, Some Chinese Factory Bosses Live It Up: Economic
Transition Gives Managers Wide Autonomy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1994, at A21. (quoting Liu
Shiyi, Vice Mayor of Shunde, China: "Many state factories have become an empire, with the
general manager as the emperor who is accountable to nobody.").
90. Schutz Lee, China move blurs distinction between local, foreign shares, Bus. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1994, at 1. But see Market Maturity in China, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A16
(reporting the announcement by the China Securities Reporting Commission that restrictions
allowing B-share ownership only by foreigners will be revived).
91. Initially, foreigners would be allowed to buy only A shares that also had B and H share
listings. Dede Nickerson, New Hope for A-share Sales, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 7, 1995,
at 3.
(Vol. 18:115
Chinese Securities Law
managers because of their greater expertise.92 In the view of some foreign
investors, the superior technology that they contribute dissuades the
majority shareholder from taking unfair advantage of its position with
regard to voting.93 Foreigners who are in the minority within an enterprise
may negotiate for special agreements, and may even be in control in a
practical sense.94
VI. THE FUTURE OF CHINESE SECURITIES MARKETS
In order to further develop Chinese securities markets, the government
must not only accelerate its efforts to draft a national securities law, but
must also standardize the management of securities markets. A number
of issues require attention.
A. The Involvement of Professionals
Though they lack detail, the Interim Rules require professional
documentation in areas such as asset valuation, auditing reports and legal
opinions in a company's application for permission to issue shares.95 The
CSRC has acted to specifically authorize many individual firms to provide
these services,96 and the CRSC and other agencies have issued a number
of regulations defining their qualifications. 97
The CSRC provides no rationale for why a licensed lawyer, accoun-
tant, appraiser, or auditor should need further permission to prepare the
92. RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
§ 21.11 (1995).
93. WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMAN & JEAN-PIERRE BEGUIN, JOINT-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 385 (1971).
94. Id.
95. Interim Rules, supra note 30, arts. 13.8, 13.9 & 13.10.
96. The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) reports thai the agency has "authorized 74
accounting firms, 172 law firms, 82 capital assessment firms, and many asset-management and
investment consultancy organizations to standardize the operation and listing of public
companies." BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Dec.
20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
97. Regulations include the following: Temporary Provisions Concerning the Confirmation
of Qualifications of Law Firms and Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law, issued by the Ministry
of Justice and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, 1993; Provisions Concerning the
Confirmation of the Registration and Qualifications of Accounting Firms and Accountants
Engaged in Securities Industry Work, issued by the Ministry of Finance and the Chinese
Securities Regulatory Commission, 1993; Provisions Concerning the Confirmation of the
Qualifications of Property Appraisers and Property Appraisal Organizations that are Engaged
in Securities Work, issued by the State Asset Management Bureau and the Securities Regulatory
Commission, 1993; Notice Concerning Problems in Confirming the Qualifications of Auditing
Firms Engaged in Securities Work, issued by the Audit Office of the Securities Regulatory
Commission, 1993. See Fang, supra note 58, at 176 n.80 (citing Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu
Guanli Weiyuan Hui Gongbao [BULL. OF THE CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION],
1993, vol. 2, at 289-97).
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documents required by the Interim Rules. The focus should instead be on
promoting high standards and penalizing malpractice by these profes-
sionals. Accordingly, the rule should be that any licensed professional may
be involved in securities markets, subject however to sanctions by the
government or malpractice actions by his clients.
B. The Possibility of Merger and Acquisition
Certain transactions that are routine in Western economies and that
contribute to the vigor and efficiency of the economy are all but impos-
sible under Chinese conditions. Mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, and
corporate takeovers all have potential for restructuring allocation of
resources and improving management of enterprises. Those transactions
are largely dependent, however, on alienability of ownership in enterprises.
In China, state shares and legal person shares, which comprise the
preponderance of all outstanding stock, are critical impediments to
alienability.98 Though one enterprise might buy some of the outstanding
stock of another on the securities markets, it cannot possibly buy enough
to take control.
Serious economic problems may force changes in these policies.99
Foreign investors might be permitted to buy or merge with Chinese
enterprises as an expedient means of entering the Chinese market or
expanding their operations."°° In the absence of a national securities law,
some municipalities have permitted or even facilitated such transactions.'°'
The difficulty with freely permitting acquisition of Chinese firms is
ideological: the danger of undercutting the Marxist-Leninist principle of
ownership of the means of production by the people, as represented by
the state. 0 2 Unless the Chinese government is willing to drop this key
98. Qian, supra note 49, at 92.
99. As stated by one commentator, "faced with a chronic budget deficit, worrisome inflation
and slower growth, China must make some tough decisions." Hong Kong: xxx "not a lender",
UPI, Dec. 27, 1995, available in LEXis, Nexis Library, Cumws File [hereinafter, Hong Kong].
100. Id.
101. The Wall Street Journal reported that "some provinces have sold off entire state
factories to foreign investors." One city in Fujian province, for example, sold 41 factories to
a tycoon for Singapore in a single transaction. National assets are often sold to joint ventures
controlled by foreigners. Craig S. Smith, China Is Revitalizing State Sector, Starting at the
Factory Level, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1996, at A12.
102. As stated in Article 6 of China's 1982 Constitution, "the basis of the socialist
economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means
of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working
people." XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], art.6 (P.R.C.), translation available in LExIs, Intlaw Library,
Chinalaw File.
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ideological tenet, 0 3 the western-type merger, acquisition or takeover will
remain problematic.
When a state-owned enterprise cannot succeed on its own, China has
two alternatives. One is to further develop the joint venture, which has
been termed the "Chinese approach to M&A." t 4 The Chinese side would
contribute state-owned assets, and the foreign coventurer would contribute
cash.10 5 The other alternative is to allow investors to acquire small state-
owned enterprises.' 6 Both of these choices are preferable to bankruptcy,
in that they are more likely to minimize unemployment, a very serious and
dangerous problem.'0 7
Until and unless Chinese law explicitly allows foreign companies to
merge with or acquire Chinese enterprises, their options to invest in China
are limited. They can either seek to circumvent the rules, or they can
establish wholly foreign owned companies, which are expressly allowed. 0 8
C. Preparing Financial Statements According to
International Accounting Standards
At present, international standards for preparing disclosures to
potential investors may or may not apply, depending on the class of stock
103. Ownership of the means of production may be seen as a primary justification for the
existence of the state. Privatization would therefore undercut the ideological basis of the
government. Bersani, supra note 45, at 305.
104. See Hong Kong, supra note 99.
105. Id.
106. Guanyu Chushou Guoyou Xiaoxing Qiye Chanquan de Zanxing Banfa [The Interim
Measures Concerning Sale of Title of Wholly State-owned Small-size Enterprises] (issued
February 19, 1989). These measures, issued by the Committee of System Reformation, the
Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Bureau of State-owned Property, provide: "Buyers
can be wholly state-owned enterprises, or collectively-owned enterprises, or 'Joint Ventures,
Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises and Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures,' or private
enterprises, or partnerships and individuals." The enterprises placed for sale are ones that the
government deems itself unable to manage successfully. They fall mainly into three categories:
(1) enterprises that are insolvent or near bankruptcy; (2) businesses that are suffering from losses
or earning minimal profits over an extended term; or (3) those selected for sale "to perfect the
structure of industry."
107. One analyst stated the situation in stark terms:
China needs fresh flows of foreign investment to keep state-sector reforms from
bogging down and rendering millions jobless. 'A Chinese Gdansk is what Beijing
fears most,' says a Shanghai economist referring to the shipyard strikes that contrib-
uted to the fall of communism in Poland.
Smith, supra note 101, at A12.
108. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises,
art. 1, issued by National People's Congress (April 12, 1986), available in LEXis, Intlaw Library,
Chinalaw File.
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being sold.' °9 For the sale of B and H stock, financial statements must
meet international accounting standards; for sale of A stock, they need not
be prepared in that manner."0
A recent decision by the China Securities Regulatory Commission,
however, may change this situation with respect to A shares. Fund
management firms will be organized, with Chinese and foreign partici-
pation, seeking foreign investment in A shares.'' Foreign investors may
not be willing to invest without sufficient information prepared in accor-
dance with international standards." 2
D. Securities Fraud and Insider Trading
In the United States and other western countries, "securities fraud" and
"insider trading" are well-developed legal concepts, with corresponding
bodies of law that serve to enhance investor confidence in the market.
China has adopted provisions very similar to those of the U.S. For
example, the Interim Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud, promul-
gated by the State Council on September 2, 1993, provide detailed
definitions of such terms as "insider" and "inside information",.
l3
109. Spencer, supra note 26, at 29.
110. Id.
111. Lee, supra note 90, at 1.
112. See generally SEC Chairman Warns that U.S. is 'Cautious' about Chinese Firms,
supra note 81, at B14A (Arthur Levitt, Chair of the SEC "warned that U.S. stock-market
investors will remain 'cautious' toward Chinese companies until they improve disclosure.").
113. Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Zanxing Banfa [Interim Measures on Prohibiting
Securities Fraud], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Sept. 4, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter, the
"Interim Measures"]. For example, the Interim Measures define insiders to include:
(1) an issuer's directors, supervisors, senior managemental personnel, secretaries,
typists and other staff who could obtain inside information based on their positions;
(2) professionals such as lawyers, accountants, assets evaluation personnel and
investment consultants; management and business personnel from securities ex-
changes; and other persons who could obtain inside information based on their
business relationship with an issuer;
(3) those who can exercise power of management or supervision based on laws and
regulations, such as the staff of securities supervision departments and securities
exchanges, the staff of the departments in charge of an issuer and from approval
institutions, and the staff of economic management departments in charge of industry
and commerce, and taxes;
(4) those with access to inside information by their career and positions, or by their
contractual or work relationship with an issuer, including journalists, editors of
newspapers or magazines, hosts of radio and television and printing personnel;
(5) all other persons who could touch inside information through legal channels.
Overall, the concept of insiders is quite broad. Still, it does not mention relatives of insiders.
Id.
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The legal theories and interpretations behind these rules, however, are
not well developed. For example, there is no clear statement of an
insider's fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from trading, and there exists
no misappropriation theory."' China would benefit from more extensive
borrowing from the jurisprudence of countries with a longer history of
regulating securities trading.
China's current effort to build a fair securities market should empha-
size the elimination of what have been called "power shares"--a term not
found in the official classification. Power shares reflect corruption on the
infant stock market, which has not been sufficiently transparent. The
procedure of issuing stock is not open enough, and inequitable trading
often happens. One leading commentator states that "government agencies
and high-level officials take advantage of their power to purchase stocks
before the public can."' "
E. Golden Share-A New Way to Control
State-owned Enterprises in China?
One concept that may be useful to China is the "golden share"-a
device that originated during the British privatization of state-held firms
such as Britoil and Jaguar in the 1980s. When the Conservative govern-
ment of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sold the two firms, the British
Government retained a so-called "golden share" in each organization. This
"golden share" allowed the government to outvote all other shareholders,
even if the government did not otherwise own a controlling number of
equity shares.1
6
China's government currently is seeking to reduce the proportion of
the economy under state ownership while avoiding privatization." 7 The
government will likely be unwilling to allow the proportion of state
ownership to decline below 50%, if that means, as it normally would, that
the government loses control. In this situation, the golden share concept
could provide a solution. The government could reduce its ownership to
114. Under this theory, a person violates Rule lOb-5 when he misappropriates material,
non-public information in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and
confidence, and uses that information in a securities transaction. See United States v. Carpenter,
791 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (2nd Cir. 1986); S.E.C. v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2nd Cir. 1984);
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2nd Cir. 1981).
115. Qian, supra note 49, at 72.
116. Baev, supra note 9, at 20.
117. Zhou Xin & Dong Cunfa, First Woman Postdoc in Social Sciences in China, 39
BEIJING REV., Mar. 18-24, 1996, at 24. The important issue is how much the state can reduce
its percentage ownership and still be considered publicly owned. This answer, however, is not
provided. Id.
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a minority position, thus permitting the firm to become a non-state
enterprise, but still retain a measure of control. The firm would have more
autonomy to operate its business, with attendant benefits of efficiency and
market orientation, and the government would still maintain the principle
of socialist public ownership.
F. Issuance of Shares Based on Market Mechanisms
Without Government Approval
A reform that would be considered radical in China, though not
elsewhere, would be to permit market factors, rather than extensive
government regulation, to determine which companies can issue shares." 8
To date, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges list only about 300
enterprises." 9
The Interim Rules sharply restrict and regulate access to the securities
markets by imposing numerous conditions. For example, the company's
proposal must be consistent with the government's industrial policy.
Shares must be allocated according to these rules: at least 35% to the
promoter; at least 25% to the public; and no more than 10% of the issue
can be sold to employees or managers. Additionally, the value of the stock
purchased by the promoter should be at least 30 million yuan. 20
These requirements prevent many firms from entering the securities
market and, more basically, hobble the operation of free market forces.
One example of this problem is the impact on companies with favorable
prospects for the future but current cash flow problems or other financial
difficulties. In some cases, additional investment would permit the
companies an opportunity to recover, and to avoid losses to their creditors,
employees, and shareholders. 12 Regulation that excludes those companies
from the capital markets at the moment of their greatest need may
sentence them to unnecessary failure, and worsen their losses.'22
If Chinese securities markets are to achieve their potential for eco-
nomic reform and efficiency, the government must reconcile itself to the
freer operation of market mechanisms, and allow all firms that want to
raise capital to negotiate with securities firms.1
23
118. Spencer, supra note 26, at 29.
119. Id. at 28.
120. Interim Rules, supra note 30, art. 8.
121. Art & Gu, supra note 62, at 303.
122. Id.
123. Spencer, supra note 26.
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CONCLUSION
China's developing securities market can be properly understood only
in the context of its underlying motivation, by carefully avoiding the
mistake of assuming that adoption of western-style structures and laws
implies movement toward western goals. The government of China intends
only to restructure its state-owned enterprises to improve productivity.
Privatization as practiced in the previously communist countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union would be highly dangerous
in China,124 and is rejected. Through securitization, the government will
reduce the percentage of state ownership in enterprises. Somewhat
paradoxically, the sale of equity interests to private parties is designed to
enhance, not to dilute, "the socialist public ownership economy" estab-
lished in the Constitution. 12' The policy is to attract private, and particu-
larly foreign, investment and managerial skills to the enterprises, con-
tributing to the development of the Chinese economy. The enterprises,
however, will remain subject to ultimate control by the state through its
majority stock ownership.
As China's securities regulation develops (and when the National
People's Congress promulgates the first national law on the subject), it
almost certainly will superficially follow American and Western patterns.
Nevertheless, the Chinese economy will continue to be dominated by
state-owned enterprises, not by entrepreneurial, capitalist business in the
Western sense. 26 Western securities concepts and structures will be
adapted to serve China's socialist purposes.
124. Excellent points are made by two analysts, who opined that:
[I]f China re-distributes its assets like in the former Soviet Union and the East
European countries, the productive force in the country will be severely destroyed.
Violent social chaos will be inevitable, and the economic reform will suffer a
standstill or even retrogression.
Zhou & Dong, supra note 117, at 24.
125. The Amended Chinese Constitution provides that, "[tihe state permits the private
economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private economy is a
supplement to the socialist public ownership economy. The state protects the lawful rights and
interests of the private economy and exercises guidance, supervision and control over it."
ZHOUGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution], art. 11 (P.R.C.), amended by P.R.C.
Proclamation No. 8, Apr. 12, 1988. In fact, compared to the Constitution of 1978, the 1988
Amendment has changed and now sanctions private investment. Id Further change in the
Constitution to support privatization seems highly unlikely in the near future. See supra Part
V.
126. Art & Gu, supra note 62, at 307.
Fall 1996]
